Death as Divorce for the Abandoned Spouse:
Davis v Combes and the Cautious and
Gender-Sensitive Judiciary
Saul Levmore†
I. DAVIS V COMBES
Brenda Combes was a highly educated and well-employed
mother and spouse who died at age forty-three,1 following some
serious medical issues known to her family. At the time, her surviving spouse, David Combes, was employed in a less remunerative position, but in describing the facts of this marriage in Davis
v Combes,2 Judge Diane Wood, hearing on appeal a case about
Brenda’s life insurance proceeds, notes that David earned much
less income than did Brenda.3 It is likely that David occasionally
served as a stay-at-home father. The couple had two children,
first a daughter, and then a son born shortly before his mother’s
death.4 The family’s childcare arrangements are not revealed by
Judge Wood or in the lower court decision she reverses. David
Combes had an older child from a previous marriage, but we are
also not told where this child resided.5 While David had child support obligations arising from his earlier divorce, we know that he
was able to get them suspended, at least during his period of unemployment.6 Brenda and David seemed to keep their financial
lives fairly separate, though David pointed to various things, like
insurance policies and Brenda’s rental of a bank vault, that he
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Davis, 294 F3d at 934–35.
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See id at 934.
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Davis, No 1:98-cv-1153, slip op at 14.
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paid for by check or cash.7 It is plausible that the couple’s separate
accounting was motivated by the details of the termination of his
first marriage. We are also not told whether Brenda died intestate, though it may not have mattered because the couple had no
significant assets other than the life insurance proceeds. They
had purchased a home, but we can assume that it was highly
mortgaged.8
After Brenda’s death, and accompanied by Brenda’s surviving sister, Linda Davis, David unlocked the bank vault that he
knew contained his wife’s various insurance policies.9 He was surprised to find it empty.10 Documents pertaining to Brenda’s life
insurance policies were now in Linda’s hands. Brenda had recently changed, or tried to change, each of her three insurance
policies to benefit Linda.11 These policies had previously named
David and their daughter as beneficiaries.12 Perhaps Linda was
coy, or eager to see her much disliked brother-in-law’s reaction
when he opened the empty vault and discovered that his financial
situation had been drastically altered.
Without a doubt, David felt cheated and betrayed, and he
eventually developed several legal arguments for his claim to the
policy proceeds. First, he argued that he and Brenda had an
agreement, or contract, to buy matching insurance policies in favor of the other.13 He produced no external or written evidence of
this agreement,14 but he had, and had paid for, policies on his own
life that continued to name Brenda as the beneficiary.15 At times
these policies were more generous to Brenda than hers were to
him.16 One policy named their first child, and this was consistent
with an agreement to provide about equally for their children’s
welfare.17 No policy named the last-born child, but it is likely that
this was because that child was born close to Brenda’s death when
the couple surely was attending to other matters. In any event,
7
See id at 13 (noting that David could not produce any documents supporting his
claims).
8
See Davis, 294 F3d at 934 (noting that the couple had signed for a mortgage less
than six months before Brenda passed away).
9
See Continental Assurance Co v Davis, 2000 WL 1141434, *2 (ND Ill).
10 See id.
11 See id at *1.
12 See id.
13 Continental Assurance Co, 2000 WL 1141434 at *1.
14 See Davis, No 1:98-cv-1153, slip op at 14.
15 See Davis, 294 F3d at 934–35.
16 See id.
17 Id.
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the lower court was convinced that David kept his part of the apparent but unrecorded bargain,18 and it found him—and not his
sister-in-law, Linda—to be a credible witness regarding Brenda’s
intentions and other matters.19
It may seem surprising that the couple did not simply choose
to each buy one or more policies on his or her spouse’s life, with
the purchaser as beneficiary, but some of the policies were employer-based, so perhaps this was impractical. While Judge Wood
does not seem interested in this, perhaps it is why the lower-court
judge noted Brenda’s serious illness.20 Anything other than a
group policy would have required disclosures or a medical examination, and an individual life insurance policy would likely have
been impossible to obtain. In any event, Brenda’s various policies
probably reflected the fact that she could only obtain modest coverage through her employment or alumni association, without regard to her medical history. All of these policies had initially
named the couple’s daughter and David as beneficiaries.21 The
changed policies that Brenda had apparently handed to Linda
suddenly named Linda as the sole beneficiary.22 David argued
that the contract with him was breached by this change in beneficiaries, and that equity allows or even requires a court to reinstate the contract.23 If he had had such a contract in writing, he
would have almost surely enjoyed a quick victory under estate
law (as well as under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 197424 (ERISA)).25

18

See Davis, No 1:98-cv-1153, slip op at 19.
See id at 16–17.
20 See id at 3.
21 See Davis, 294 F3d at 934.
22 See id at 935.
23 See id.
24 Pub L No 93-406, 88 Stat 829, codified at 29 USC § 1001 et seq.
25 Courts are inevitably mixed regarding the importance of adhering to formal requirements where life insurance contracts are concerned. As the text will explore, a failure
to adhere to formal requirements thus gives courts a chance to do what they think necessary to avoid absurd results or to advance their conception of what makes for good law.
When the contract is about death benefits or retirement payments governed by ERISA,
the matter is slightly different because the ERISA statute is in various places explicit
about the importance of certain formal requirements regarding signatures and attestations. Still, courts feel somewhat free to say when formalities can be overlooked. To insist
that all formal requirements be met is, of course, to invite litigation, error, and overinvestment in meeting the formal requirements. See Burns v Orthotek, Inc Employees’ Pension
Plan & Trust, 657 F3d 571, 575–78 (7th Cir 2011) (overlooking some formal requirements in
order to reach a reasonable result and citing Davis for doing the same in a non-ERISA case).
19
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A second argument that might have made it easy for a judge
to intervene in favor of the surviving and financially abandoned
spouse and children was that Brenda submitted the most significant life insurance change to her employer’s human resources department—but did not sign it, as the policy explicitly required.26
Linda argued that the fact that Brenda physically submitted the
form naming Linda as the new beneficiary should be sufficient
and dispositive.27 But Brenda had managed to correctly sign the
other policies and their (sometimes identical) change-of-beneficiary forms.28 She was, in any event, not unsophisticated. There
is the possibility that Brenda did not sign precisely because the
form said that it was not binding until signed and dated, and she
was hesitant about making these important changes. A signature
denotes formality and closure; on the other hand, it is just a scribble that might be missed by someone who has just spent an hour
going through forms with someone pointing to places where a signature, not to mention some certification or other, is “required.”
At the risk of giving away where the argument here is
headed, it is worth noting, or asserting, that Judge Wood (like
most judges) is often comfortable with—and even very much inclined toward—formality and following statutes and rules when
they are on point.29 It is one thing for important judges to rise to
the occasion, and to draw on their experience and academic skill
when statutes are evasive, or even when precedent is weak. In
these situations, judges are regularly criticized for making law,
or to the contrary for declining to improve the world around them.
It is quite another to do so when this requires casting aside constitutional or statutory language. As we will see, Davis was a
once-in-a-career opportunity to do something radical with regard

26 There have been other cases on this “formality” topic after the case. Compare, for
example, Hall v Metropolitan Life Insurance Co, 750 F3d 995, 996–97 (8th Cir 2014) (affirming a lower court’s refusal to intervene in a policy denial given the policy’s requirement
for timely submission, even though the decedent both changed his will saying that his wife
should receive insurance proceeds and signed but failed to submit a change-of-beneficiary
form); Kmatz v Metropolitan Life Insurance Co, 232 F Appx 451, 456–57 (6th Cir 2007)
(declining to intervene after finding that decedent’s blank change-of-beneficiary form
failed even to substantially comply with the policy’s requirements), with Connecticut General Life Insurance Co v Gulley, 668 F2d 325, 326–28 (7th Cir 1982) (finding substantial
compliance where decedent left his change-of-beneficiary form with his daughter instead
of submitting it to his employer as required by the policy).
27 See Davis, 294 F3d at 940–42.
28 See Continental Assurance, 2000 WL 1141434 at *4.
29 This tendency is evident from other essays, in honor of Judge Wood, in this issue
of The University of Chicago Law Review.
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to estate, insurance, and divorce law—and it was likely an opportunity to intervene on behalf of gender equality, or at least unfairly treated women.
But it was an opportunity declined or perhaps unnoticed. In
defense or in praise of Judge Wood, it should be noted that courts
often face the question whether to enforce contractual (or statutory) requirements or to bend a bit and attempt to discern the
intent of the parties. It may be unusual for a circuit court to reverse a lower court on this matter, but here, it is indeed more
likely than not that Brenda intended to change the beneficiary
designation from her husband and daughter to her sister. In legal
language, we can say that though Brenda did not comply with the
stated requirements for changing the beneficiary, she did show
“substantial compliance” by entering her sister’s name as the new
beneficiary, delivering the document to her employer, and even
by removing the document from her bank vault and giving it to
her sister.30 To the extent that appellate cases become known for
a single thing, Judge Wood may have decided that the future of
the substantial compliance doctrine was the important matter at
stake here.
Returning to the details of the case, my guess is that a lawyer
arguing on behalf of a client like David Combes, who was essentially disinherited by an unsigned document where a signature
was required, would be especially pleased to draw Judge Wood as
the decision-maker. In David’s case, where there is room to bypass the spirit of some of Illinois’s laws, it would be reasonable to
prefer drawing Judge Wood rather than Judge Richard Posner,
for example. The latter might use the occasion to bring into being
some new principles of contractual formality, inheritance law, insurance, or optimal intergenerational transfers, as discussed
presently. The law in every state makes it quite difficult to disinherit a spouse,31 for example, and it is easy to imagine an aggressive judge extending this principle to its interpretation of life insurance policies, especially so when these policies contain the
bulk of family assets.
Where there is room to enforce the requirement that a document effectively disinheriting my client be signed, I would want a
30

See Davis, 294 F3d at 940–42; Continental Assurance, 2000 WL 1141434 at *1.
Terry L. Turnipseed, Community Property v. The Elective Share, 72 La L Rev 161,
162 (2011) (noting that “49 of the 50 states and the District of Columbia limit freedom of
testation vis-à-vis surviving spouses,” whether by forced heirship, elective share, or community property).
31
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judge known to enforce legal requirements, rather than one prone
to creativity and to fashioning new law. It is only fair to note that
Judge Wood may have simply felt bound by Illinois law, which
strongly adopts the view that one can dispose of the assets one
possesses; it practically rejects the Uniform Probate Code’s tendency to view a couple as a partnership.32 Still, David Combes, as
a single parent with two young children and a low earned-income
history (not to mention an older, but still minor, child for whom
he had some responsibility), as well as with testimony that a
lower court found credible, is a sympathetic plaintiff, and one
with the signature requirement on his side. It is not the ideal case
to advance the cause of substantial compliance. To be clear, if
Brenda had signed the documents favoring her sister over her
surviving husband and child, and had told David of her changes,
we could be sure Judge Wood would adhere to the Illinois statute’s
insistence on following the individual property owner’s intentions
and declarations.
As a lawyer, my only hope would be to get Judge Posner rather than Judge Wood, for only an aggressive judge would say
that when all the life insurance and circumstances are added together, David had essentially been disinherited, and law does not
and should not favor such an outcome. While one judge might say
that a legislature that allowed a surviving spouse to elect against
a will (in order to avoid complete disinheritance) signaled that it
did not intend equivalent protection for a spouse who was dislocated by a change in insurance beneficiaries, a more aggressive
judge might say that the same legislature showed that it wished
to protect surviving spouses, and so that principle ought to apply
to a case like Davis. The latter sort of contextual judicial intervention would be easiest—or even only conceivable—when, as in
Davis, the disinheritance is accomplished in secrecy and thus
does not allow room for a bargain between the spouses while they
are alive. It is, after all, possible that had David known that
Brenda changed the policies, he would have moved toward divorce, and through this means possibly have secured financial

32 See Davis, 294 F3d at 937 (“Illinois’s substantive law emphasiz[es] the ‘paramount’
right of property owners while they are alive to dispose of their belongings (including the
proceeds of life insurance policies) as they see fit, even if their decisions impair a marital
partner’s future interest in the property.”), quoting Wood v Wood, 672 NE2d 385, 388–89
(Ill App 1996). See also James J. Carroll, The Interplay of Probate Assets and Nonprobate
Assets in the Administration of a Decedent’s Estate, 25 DePaul L Rev 363, 370–71 (1976)
(noting “Illinois’ strong policy in favor of the free alienability of property by a spouse”).
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support for himself and the couple’s children. To be sure, Brenda’s
death might have made this strategy of little value, but it is possible that a court supervising the divorce would have required a
trust fund in the children’s favor.
My suggestion about what an aggressive judge might do
brings us to what we might call a third and equally subtle argument in David’s favor. It is that while our laws are less explicitly
egalitarian than those of most European countries, we essentially
have the spirit of dower (or even of forced heirship) in our country.
We should not expect lawyers to ask courts to institute laws that
are rejected by our legislatures, but it is worth thinking about the
spirit of these statutes and their migration into American law.
Many statutes (and even Illinois’s divorce law) treat the family as
a partnership, or simply reflect the view that survivors ought to
be supported. Marriage typically promises the surviving spouse
something between one-third and two-thirds of the family’s estate, whether or not the decedent leaves a will, or even leaves a
will that seeks to disinherit the surviving spouse.33 Even funds
given away some time before death to a charity can be clawed
back to the estate and subject to forced heirship, and the same is
probably true for wealth given away just before divorce.34
Outside of Louisiana,35 our states do not have forced heirship
statutes, but they have all taken some steps in the direction of
treating a family, and certainly marriage, as a partnership of
sorts. They have Homestead Allowances, for example, so that the
survivor is not left without a place to sleep.36 Most also ensure

33

See, for example, 755 ILCS 5/2-1 (requiring that the surviving spouse and descendant each receive one-half of the entire estate, or if there is no descendant, that the entire
estate goes to surviving spouse); 755 ILCS 5/503 (requiring equitable distribution of marital property as opposed to fifty-fifty split of community property); 755 ILCS 5/2-8 (providing that the surviving spouse can renounce a will to receive a share of either one-third of
the entire estate if the testator leaves a descendant, or one-half of the entire estate if no
descendant). See also Carroll, 25 DePaul L Rev at 367 (cited in note 32).
34 See Katherine S. Spaht, Kathryn V. Lorios, Cynthia Picou, Cynthia Samuel, and
Frederick W. Swaim Jr, The New Forced Heirship Legislation: A Regrettable Revolution,
50 La L Rev 409, 473 & n 260 (1990) (noting that jurors tend “to rewrite a will in accordance with their idea of what is a fair distribution” and invalidate transfer instruments if
there is undue influence, which depends in part on whether the disposition is “unnatural,”
for example by favoring a friend or charity over a spouse or children) (quotation marks
omitted), quoting Jesse Dukeminier and Stanley M. Johanson, Wills, Trust, and Estates
477 (Little, Brown 3d ed 1984).
35 La Civ Code art 1493.
36 For the Illinois version, which uses the term “Exemption,” protecting the surviving
spouse (and minor child) while living in the home, see 735 ILCS 5/12-901 to -902.
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that the survivor receives an amount sufficient to support the couple’s previous lifestyle for the larger portion of a year.37 Community property states treat property acquired during the marriage
as equally owned, and divide it accordingly upon death or divorce.
Most significantly, nearly all the other states give the survivor
the right to elect against the will.38 If the will disinherits the surviving spouse by giving $1 for instance, the survivor has some
months to think about it and then to decline the $1 and elect to
receive one-third or one-half of the estate. In some states this is
the probate estate and in some it is the enhanced, or augmented,
estate.39 For our purposes, the details are not important except for
two things. First, life insurance is not included in the probate estate, and Illinois, the Combes’ home state, is neither a community
property state nor one that augments estates.40 Second, in Illinois,
one can take a step toward disinheriting a spouse by buying a
large amount of life insurance, and naming someone other than
the spouse as beneficiary. Note that even in states that, unlike
Illinois, claw back life insurance to the estate, the claw back may
apply to expenditures made to purchase insurance, rather than
to the proceeds of an insurance policy.41 In any event, recall that
the battle in our case is not (yet) about a probate or enhanced
estate. It is fair to deduce that David and his young children’s only
hope for money was for the proceeds of the insurance policies.42

37 In Illinois, the protection is for the cost of living for a nine-month period, with a
minimum of $20,000, and significantly more where there are dependent children. 755
ILCS 5/15-1.
38 Georgia, the exception, offers instead a “year’s support in the form of property” to
a decedent’s surviving spouse and minor children. Ga Code Ann § 53-3-1.
39 While an issue of some historic debate, the Uniform Probate Code and the twentytwo states that follow it include life insurance in the augmented estate. Uniform Probate
Code §§ 2-202–205, 2-208 (National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws
amended 2010). See also generally G. Michael Bridge, Note, Uniform Probate Code Section 2-202: A Proposal to Include Life Insurance Assets Within the Augmented Estate, 74
Cornell L Rev 511 (1989).
40 See Carroll, 25 DePaul L Rev at 378–79 (cited in note 32). Illinois law does not
include life insurance proceeds in the elective share. 755 ILCS 35/2-8.
41 Thus, if A buys a policy and names his new partner, G, as the beneficiary of a $1
million policy, A’s surviving spouse, B, might claw back the $50,000 premium paid for the
policy, but it is by no means clear that B will be awarded the entire $1 million dollars
payable to G.
42 Students of trusts and estates law may want to know whether David could have
elected against the will, if there was one; not least given that Illinois is not a community
property state. We can avoid the details here and note the important point that there were
at least three ways for a judge to decide in David’s favor, and against Brenda’s sister. Most
of these methods would have split the difference between the surviving spouse and the
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Before putting Judge Wood and the role of the judiciary at
the center of the story, it is worth emphasizing the omitted and
unknown variables. Perhaps Brenda knew that her sister would
be a better caregiver for her children than would David, though it
is worth repeating that the lower court found Linda evasive and
not credible as a witness. There is no hint in the record that she
would be the superior caregiver, and she refused the idea of putting the insurance proceeds in a trust for the children.43 Still,
Brenda may have had faith in Linda, or fears about David’s future
intentions. She may have sought to change her life insurance policies in order to give her sister funds to help with the task of caring for the surviving children. A philosophically interesting possibility is that Brenda resented and feared David’s obligation or
inclination to care for the child from his previous marriage. The
child was a teenager at the time of Brenda’s death and, with the
cost of college in mind, Brenda may have been concerned that the
family’s assets, which she might well have thought of as generated by her rather than by David, would be directed unfairly to
that first child. In short, Brenda may have been just the sort of
person Illinois law (and Judge Wood) sought to empower.
To be sure, she could have set up a trust in favor of her children, in order to exclude David’s first child from access to her assets, but this involves effort and requires some thought about
other unforeseen events. If her sister were trustworthy, it would
be easier to direct assets to her, and to direct Linda about appropriate expenditures. These seem like reasonable possibilities that
might have influenced Judge Wood and the lower court. Without
explicit evidence, one or all the involved courts may have hesitated to explain the reasoning in print. On the other hand, it
seems unlikely that Judge Wood would reverse the lower court—
for it too was aware that Illinois law required a high level of proof
before imposing a constructive trust—inasmuch as it knew more
about the parties than she would likely have known simply from
reading their lawyers’ papers.

named sibling, because the unsigned change-of-beneficiary form affected only one of three
insurance policies.
43 Davis, No 1:98-cv-1153, slip op at 16, 22.
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II. THE ROLE OF GENDER
I think it is plausible, or perhaps likely, that if the genders
were reversed, Judge Wood would have decided the case differently. In an unscientific poll, I have tried these inverted facts on
many law professors, educated citizens, and a few elected officials. I ask them, and now my readers, to imagine the case of a
well-employed husband, Brian, who has two young children and
a stay-at-home wife, Dina, who has occasionally been employed,
but who earns much less income than does Brian. The couple does
not have much savings, but each has life insurance policies. If
Dina dies, Brian will need to hire a childcare person and, if Brian
dies, Dina will be quite stressed and will need to replace Brian’s
income, look for a better-paying job than she has at present, and
find enough money to pay for childcare. She will be a single
mother with two young children. Now imagine that not only does
Brian die, but also that Dina discovers, when it is too late to react,
that he secretly changed the beneficiary of his life insurance policies to someone other than his spouse. Fortunately for his spouse,
Dina, one of the changes he sought to make was unsigned, and a
signature was required. Lawyers, and even nonlawyer citizens accustomed to secure property rights, tend to like the idea that a
person who made money gets to decide how to spend it.
But virtually everyone I have asked thinks that—even in Illinois—a court should and will take advantage of the fact that one
form was unsigned in order to give the surviving and surprised
spouse, Dina, some money. About half of the respondents think
courts should find a way to give Dina the proceeds of all the insurance policies, and not just the one that had an unsigned
change-of-beneficiary form. Essentially, they find the forced-heirship norm attractive, and might even go beyond the rules found
around the world. They think of the family as a team, and especially so because Dina was occupied at home in the interest of the
family, we might presume, when she could have been out earning
money and advancing her own career. If Brian sought to divorce
her, everyone thinks that a court should award her (and the children) considerable resources at least until the children are of age.
But he did not seek divorce, and instead he died (in this hypothetical)—and secretly changed his insurance policies to disfavor his
surviving spouse. It is hard to see why Dina should do any worse
in these circumstances than she would have in the event of abandonment and divorce by Brian. Most who think that Brian’s sibling, or another third party, is entitled to one or two of the life
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insurance policies’ proceeds, because Brian is entitled to do with
“his” money as he likes, and especially so in Illinois where this
intuition is written into the statute, also think the sibling-recipient is morally bound to apply much of the money to the upbringing of Dina’s children.
Before turning to the forced-heirship principle more directly,
it may be useful to restate the point implicitly made here. It is
that Judge Wood has been influenced by evolving sentiments
about gender. If the surviving spouse had been female, I think it
quite likely that the decision would have drawn on at least two
out of three of the arguments advanced by David. There was the
failure to sign one of the documents, and then the argument that
Brenda broke an implicit agreement. She may even have committed fraud, inducing her spouse to buy life insurance on his own
life with her as the beneficiary, but then failing to keep her side
of the bargain and, for all we know, planning on this all along.
The fact that by all accounts she sought to change the beneficiary
without informing David adds significantly to this version of the
story.
It is inappropriate and even beside the point to insist that
Judge Wood was wrong and influenced by gender, even though law
claims to be neutral about this characteristic. But appellate court
decisions are meant to be followed, and it should be noted that the
next time a case like Davis arises, it will likely be a single mother
who is left unmoored and without money. On the other hand, as
noted presently, perhaps Judge Wood had other fish to fry.
III. PROTECTING THE ABANDONED SPOUSE: TREATING WIDOWS
AND DIVORCED PARTIES EQUALLY WELL
I turn now to the observation that the decision in Davisgoes
about as far as it can to distance itself from the idea of forced
heirship. Again, as a technical matter, the case is not about forced
heirship or its American second cousin, electing against the will
(a descendant of dower), because Illinois law does not recapture
life insurance into the estate subject to the no-disinheritance
principle.44 Still, it is worth thinking about the comparison among
three ways to disappoint, or even cheat, an abandoned spouse.
These are: (1) divorce, followed by a battle over assets and future

44 755 ILCS 30/1, § 1 (“The designation in accordance with the terms of any insurance . . . shall not be subject to or defeated or impaired by any statute or rule of law governing the transfer of property by will, gift or intestacy.”).
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earnings; (2) death—where the decedent attempts to disinherit
the surviving spouse; and (3) death—where there is no will or
simply few assets, and where the abandoned spouse is surprised
to learn that she or he has been removed as the beneficiary of the
insurance policy. I will refer to these three scenarios as (1) divorce, (2) disinheriting, and (3) disinsuring. It is apparent that
the word “abandoned” can be thought of as financial as well as
physical abandonment. Davis is obviously an example of case (3).
Scenario (1) is the most common of the three and has accordingly
received the most statutory and judicial attention. Scenario (2)
falls in between the other two because of the ability to elect
against the will and otherwise ensure a spousal share of the estate. I have already signaled that the major goal of this Part is to
advance the argument for treating the three cases alike, based on
arguments about equality, partnership, ethical sensibilities, and
the potential that scenarios (2) and (3) could be turned into scenario (1), by bargain or by preemptory action, unless the fact of
scenario (2) or (3) is kept secret. The suggestion is that secrecy is
a kind of fraud, and where there is secrecy there is an even
stronger case for treating the abandoned, or surviving, spouse as
well as she (or he) would have been treated in the event of scenario (1), a court supervised divorce.
One problem with this approach is that scenarios (2) and (3)
are quite different from scenario (1) because in the event of divorce the abandoning spouse enjoys future earnings and these are
obviously not available in the event of death. To be sure, the divorcing spouse also has future living costs, especially in the event
of a second marriage to someone without wealth or with children
to support. For the most part, this difference between abandonment by life or death raises a set of efficiency concerns. It is unwise or politically unacceptable to discourage remarriage by either spouse or to discourage either from continuing a career or
seeking higher earnings, because the income is to be shared. This
is a familiar problem in family law, and there is no reason to rehash it here.45 As an efficiency matter, it might be ideal to have
an immediate once-and-for-all allocation based perhaps on expected future earnings and costs. This would give an incentive to
be forward-looking, and to encourage people to marry and work
as they wanted, uninfluenced by law. Unfortunately perhaps, this
45 See, for example, Jana B. Singer, Husbands, Wives, and Human Capital: Why the
Show Won’t Fit, 31 Family L Q 119, 123–24 (1997). See also Andrea Brobeil, Marriage and
Divorce, 5 Georgetown J Gender & L 529, 542–44 (2004).
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approach is likely to be politically unattractive, because someone
who is economically successful after divorce would face no obligation to support an ex-spouse who is struggling. I hope it is acceptable to insist that the allocations normally made in divorce
law, or for that matter in forced heirship jurisdictions, are good
enough. That is, there may be more money available because the
abandoning spouse continues to work, and has not died, but we
can imagine that it all works out.
Thus, in the case of divorce, we might imagine that the abandoned spouse receives half of present wealth as well as half of
future income for a period of years (often depending on the age of
the children), while the abandoning party can live or develop another family with the remaining half. Meanwhile, if the marriage
ends because of death rather than divorce, there is no future income or subsequent family to consider but, somehow, we can imagine that the abandoned family again gets about half (of the
smaller amount now available), while the abandoning party is free
to allocate the other half as he likes, thus half satisfying the widely
held view that one who makes money is entitled to dispose of it. It
is a sloppy fallback position to be sure, but again it can be superseded by contract or in most cases by a decision to divorce rather
than to trust the partner or require a formal trust instrument.
Another, perhaps legalistic, problem is that the suggestion
that these three cases ought to be treated alike ignores the existence or absence of implied contracts, signatures on insurance documents, and so forth. Put differently, the suggestion here comes
close to a forced-heirship system, and Illinois lawmakers did not
choose this well-known option. The argument here comes close to
saying that it should not matter whether Brenda Combes signed
or intended to sign the change-of-beneficiary form at her disposal.
If her marriage was a partnership, and her partner is entitled to
at least half of the available money, then we are close to the
forced-heirship norm—and far from the American understanding
of contract and property law. One response to this (decidedly oldfashioned) objection is that deception makes all the difference. If
Brenda had informed David of her decision, he could have sought
divorce or agreed to a contract or trust document that would have
ensured that the available money was used for the benefit of the
couple’s children rather than for the benefit of his first child or
even to support a lifestyle he might seek with a new spouse after
Brenda’s death. We do not know Brenda’s motivations, and it may
be that our ethical sentiments would be on her side rather than
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David’s if she had reason to fear one of these possibilities. But a
legal rule that forces information from her might be a good thing,
or even a worthy compromise. The same might be said of many
cases of disinheritance. The legal way to say this is that deception
is a kind of fraud in these cases, and that law can discourage it
with a rule that treats the abandoned spouse in scenarios (2)
and (3) about the same as it would in scenario (1), that of divorce.
On the other hand, if there is full disclosure and time to negotiate
or seek divorce, then there is a good argument for respecting a
decision like that which Brenda made. My argument for treating
scenarios (1), (2), and (3) about the same, might be limited for the
time being to instances where there is deception at the expense of
the abandoned party.
Most lawyers, and certainly Judge Wood, would regard most
of the arguments here with some incredulity because these arguments avoid the question of the balance of decision-making authority between legislatures and judges. As we have seen, Illinois
law is unfriendly to David Combes, and the state’s law was likely
on Judge Wood’s mind. Still, the argument here is made possible
by the fact that Brenda failed to sign an important document, and
she arguably defrauded her husband and denied him the opportunity to bargain or seek divorce. All this gives a judge the opportunity to innovate. But as for the larger picture, legislatures have
worked hard to fashion one’s ability to elect against a will, and
they have clearly chosen not to fully follow the European model
of forced heirship.46 Similarly, the Illinois legislature could have
said that scenario (3) is to be equalized with scenario (1), and the
rules of division in the event of divorce could be more or less delegated to courts, depending on the legislature’s view.
And yet there are important areas of law where the common
law process, even in modern times, has exerted great influence,
and judges reason that the legislature can always overrule them
with explicit statutes. It is difficult to have a strong view on this
matter. When judges are skilled, it is easy to favor their aggressiveness, but when they are aggressively mistaken, it is time to
lament judicial intrusions. The emergence of comparative negligence in tort law is a good, if intermediate, example. The doctrine
came about in some states through aggressive and innovative
judges, perhaps motivated by a sense of ethical sensibilities in
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their surrounding societies.47 It would be easy to slow down here
and just point to the fact that the decedent did not sign her
change-of-beneficiary form as required, or that she was party to
an implicit or even an explicit contract. But I prefer the more aggressive conclusion that scenarios (1), (2), and (3) should be
treated alike, and that judges can rise to the occasion and make
them so, knowing that their judge-made law can be reversed by
legislatures or even by state constitutions. In any event, Judge
Wood missed an opportunity to be innovative or to explain why
this was the wrong case to move law in a direction that seems
both ethical and efficient to most observers. It would also have
been a direction that would have benefited women in the long run
but, unfortunately, the case that came before her involved an
abandoned man rather than an abandoned and sympathetic
woman.
Finally, it may well be that Judge Wood thought of all this
and decided that creating a precedent about formalities, and the
substantial compliance doctrine, was more important than the
possibilities suggested here. She did, in the end, send the Seventh
Circuit firmly in the direction of the substantial compliance doctrine,48 so that a failure to sign, for example, is not dispositive,
and lower courts are encouraged not to take contractual, and perhaps statutory, requirements too seriously. This Essay has suggested that there was something far more interesting and important than substantial compliance at stake in Davis, but the
suggestion may be wrong. Diane Wood is not, of course, a judge to
be underestimated.
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notion to this issue just as we do in other ERISA-related disputes.”).

